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THE  INFLUENCE  OF    
JURIDICAL  CANT  ON    
EDIFICATORY  APPROACHES  IN  
21ST-‐‑CENTURY  AMERICA  
David Pozen†

T

legal education and the legal profession” has widened into a gaping chasm. Law review pages are
increasingly filled with statistical regressions, analyses of things
that happen in foreign countries, and other matters of no relevance to the bench or bar. Law school classes are taught by PhDs who are
illiterate in legal doctrine yet despise the four cases they have read. Law
professors prefer “to soar into outer space”2 rather than furnish terrestrially
grounded research assistance for judges. Thousands of federal court rulings
are published (or not3) and then never cited by a single academic paper.
†
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HE “DISJUNCTION BETWEEN
1

David Pozen is an Associate Professor at Columbia Law School.
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
Stephen G. Breyer, Response of Justice Stephen G. Breyer, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 33, 33
(2008) (“[T]here is evidence that law review articles have left terra firma to soar into outer
space.”); see also Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews
Irrelevant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (describing a public event at which Second
Circuit “judges pleaded with the law professors to write about actual cases and doctrines”).
See Erica S. Weisgerber, Note, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitu19  GREEN  BAG  2D  111  
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All of which raises a serious concern: Are judicial opinions becoming irrelevant?
The signs are everywhere, if one has the courage to look. Just consider
the Harvard Law Review’s annual issue on the Supreme Court. In past decades, the Supreme Court Forewords actually concentrated on Supreme
Court cases. In recent years, however, the Court hasn’t even done enough
meaningful legal work to sustain a single article, forcing authors to turn their
sights to such esoteric topics as “motivated cognition,”4 “system effects,”5
“demosprudence,”6 and “federalism.”7 Adding insult to injury, dedicated
sections of that law review now examine not only recent court cases but
also recent legislation,8 executive opinions,9 and UN Security Council resolutions.10 Recent comic books, one assumes, will be taken up next. The
taint by association is palpable.
Or consider what the popular data reveal. An online poll conducted in
July of this year found that only 32 percent of Americans can name a Supreme Court case and a Supreme Court Justice, while only 19 percent
frequently follow news about the Court11 – a sad decline from the approximately 100-percent levels that must have held in 1952 when Eugene Rostow observed that “the Justices are . . . teachers in a vital national seminar.”12 The Twitter data are even starker. Law professor Lawrence Lessig
tional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 621, 622 (2009) (“Presently, the federal judiciary disposes of
more than three-quarters of its cases by unpublished opinions.”).
4
Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term – Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011).
5
Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term – Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2009).
6
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term – Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2008).
7
Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term – Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).
8
See, e.g., Recent Legislation, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (2015).
9
See, e.g., Recent Executive Opinion, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2320 (2015).
10
See, e.g., Recent Draft Resolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (2015).
11
Penn Schoen Berland, U.S. Supreme Court: Key Findings (July 14, 2015), sites.c-span.
org/camerasInTheCourt/pdf/July-SCOTUS-Agenda-071415_multiple-year-tracking.pdf.
12
Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208
(1952).
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has 355,000 Twitter followers at this writing. The Judge Judy television
show has 60,000. The Court itself: zero tweets and zero followers, unless
one indulges the dubious assumption that @AngryTextualist4ever is really
Justice Scalia.
Finally, consider what young lawyers are saying about their platonic
guardians. A survey of my current and former students yields distressing
results.13 Admittedly, this survey is a fabrication and so does not necessarily
provide reliable evidence. Nonetheless, it is worth pondering this “response”
from a recent graduate, now in private practice:
Judicial opinions? I try to avoid them. I mean, sure, I have to look at
them now and again when doing research for a client. But I would rather be doing doc review or gambling online. Now that you mention it,
I can’t really think of any associate in my cohort who is all that excited
about judges’ output these days.

As I said, distressing. My current students proved no more positive in
their assessments of the state of judging. A first-year JD reflected:
I read whatever you assign. As I assume you know, that includes a
bunch of cases. I guess some have interesting facts. Usually, I get more
out of the “notes” that come after the cases. Except I find it frustrating
when the notes just pose questions without giving any answers. Why
are the casebook authors so coy? Hello, your book is a billion pages
long. Would it kill you to express a clear view once in a while?! By
the way, are our answers here going to be graded?

In sum, it is all too clear that the judicial craft has become unmoored
from real-world problems and thus in need of reform. Before we can solve
this crisis in our profession, though, we need to comprehend it better.
Why has the work of judges grown so distant from the practical concerns
of students and scholars?14
13

Cf. Edwards, supra note 1, at 41-42 (sharing “the results of a survey that [the author]
recently circulated to [his] former law clerks”).
14
For a brilliant take on this question, brought to my attention after this piece was drafted,
see the anonymous post at Judges: Ask Not What Legal Academics Can Do for You, but What
You Can Do for Legal Academia!, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 12, 2011), prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2011/07/judges-ask-not-what-legal-academics-can-do-for-you-but-what-youcan-do-for-legal-academia.html. I stand on the shoulders of a snarky, nameless giant.
AUTUMN 2015  
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I hypothesize that four factors are at play. First, judicial case selection.
Today’s academicians care about issues like the economy, the environment,
mass surveillance, drone killings, and wrongful convictions. With limited
exceptions, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have steered
well clear of these issues.15 Magically, however, all justiciability barriers
seem to melt away when a case comes along that strikes the Justices’ intellectual fancy, say a dispute involving passport markings16 or the ontology
of fish.17
Second, judicial ideology. It used to be clear to even the most hardened
realist that the Court was “the forum of principle.”18 Yet as Jeffrey Rosen
has noted, “Ever since Bush v. Gore, we’ve come to expect that federal
courts will divide along predictable ideological lines,” which in turn track
partisan lines.19 While this trend should be commended for bringing judicial
practice in closer sync with academic norms,20 it may weaken incentives
for doctrinal scholarship. Why prepare elaborate studies of legalistic questions if they will be decided in any event on political grounds?
Third, judicial interdisciplinarity. Let’s be honest: Presidents do not
select judges because they have expertise in some highfalutin discipline but
instead simply try to choose “the best qualified” lawyer around.21 When
15

See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term – Foreword: The Court’s Agenda – and
the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-12 (2006) (demonstrating that the Court “operates
overwhelmingly in areas of low public salience” and is not “deeply involved in what the
[American] people believe to be their most important problems”); see also, e.g., Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (dismissing a challenge to warrantless mass
surveillance for lack of standing); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)
(dismissing a challenge to drone strikes on standing and political question grounds); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (rejecting “actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence” as “a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding”).
16
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
17
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
18
Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981).
19
Jeffrey Rosen, No Objection, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 15, 2011, at 5. See generally LEE EPSTEIN,
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 77-85
(2013) (reviewing the empirical literature on “judicial ideology” and judicial behavior).
20
See Adam S. Chilton & Eric A. Posner, An Empirical Study of Political Bias in Legal Scholarship,
44 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2015).
21
The Supreme Court; Excerpts from News Conference Announcing Court Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
114  
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judges produce ambitious forms of social-scientific speculation,22 philosophical inquiry,23 or historical reconstruction,24 it is therefore not always
apparent why they are well suited to do so – or why students and scholars
ought to find the work useful. The Warren Court Justices, in contrast,
were such meticulous lawyers that they had no need to consult any
sources other than their own precedents and intuitions to discern the Constitution’s meaning.
Fourth, judicial infighting. Students and scholars, being pragmatic people, try to avoid getting mired in petty squabbling so that they can focus
on the pressing legal and social problems of the day. Accordingly, when
contemporary Justices describe their colleagues’ rulings as “as ‘nothing
short of ludicrous[,]’ ‘beyond the absurd,’ ‘entirely irrational,’ . . . not
‘pass[ing] the most gullible scrutiny,’”25 and the kind of thing that makes
you want to “hide [your] head in a bag,”26 the effect is to alienate the law
school crowd. And also to distract us with the inevitable questions about
paper versus plastic, eye holes or no eye holes, whether Justice Ginsburg
would draw a frowny face on the bag, and so forth.
Mix up all of these factors, and I fear we have a toxic brew that threatens
the continued relevance of the courts. What can be done? In the best tradition of legal scholarship, I now turn to prescriptions to solve this dilemma.
As an initial matter, it would help if judges started deciding a larger
number of important cases in a less political, less interdisciplinary, and less
fractious manner. These proposals follow closely from my diagnosis of the
problem.
In addition, it would help if judges started hitting the road more often,
getting themselves out of their marble monasteries and into the real
1991, at A14 (quoting President George H.W. Bush).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.” (citation omitted)).
23
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (theorizing “liberty of the person
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions”).
24
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 passim (2008).
25
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Failure to Communicate, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1705, 1715 (quoting
Justice Scalia).
26
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22
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world. For instance, a stray public remark by Chief Justice Roberts has
already sparked exciting new research into “the influence of Immanuel
Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria.”27 The Chief
Justice’s gutting of the Voting Rights Act, by comparison, has yielded little evident benefit for legal theory or pedagogy.28
If we are truly to close the gap between the judiciary and the academy,
however, neo-Kantian historiography may not be enough. No one doubts
that any law professor in the country could, in his own estimation, competently argue a case before the Court. But how many Article III appointees
could hack it in the most critically engaged and civic-minded institutions
elsewhere in our legal system? Big problems require bold solutions. Is it
time we started asking judges to attend faculty workshops?

27

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Interview at Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Annual
Conference, www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts (June
25, 2011) (“Pick up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to
be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century
Bulgaria, or something, which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it,
but isn’t of much help to the bar.”). The leading work in this burgeoning field is Orin S.
Kerr, The Influence of Immanuel Kant on Evidentiary Approaches in 18th-Century Bulgaria, 18
GREEN BAG 2D 251 (2015).
28
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). Although to be fair, the whole “equal
footing” thing was pretty creative. Cf. Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle
of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24, 24 (2013) (“The suggestion that federal
legislation must treat states equally is a chimera, without support in constitutional text,
history, or precedent.”). Within the courtroom, another promising model for closing the
judiciary-academy gap is offered by Justice Thomas’s seriatim attacks on the legitimacy of
the administrative state, see Brian Lipshutz, Justice Thomas and the Originalist Turn in Administrative Law, 125 YALE L.J. F. 94 (2015), insofar as they supply an illuminating reductio of
Philip Hamburger’s scholarship. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? (2014).
116  

19  GREEN  BAG  2D  

